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A short history of bodily sensation*
JEAN STAROBINSKI1
From the Faculte des Lettres, Universite de Geneve, Switzerland
In one of his Cahiers, Paul Valery has the note.
Somatism (heresy of the end of time),
Adoration, cult of the machine for living.1!
Have we come to the end of time? The heresy
anticipated by Valery has almost become the
official religion. Everything is related to the
body, as if it had just been rediscovered after
being long forgotten; body image, body
language, body consciousness, liberation of the
body are the passwords. Historians, prey to the
same infection, have begun inquiring into what
previous cultures have done with the body, in
the way of tattooing, mutilation, celebration
and all the rituals related to the various bodily
functions.2 Past writers from Rabelais to
Flaubert are ransacked for evidence, and im-
mediately it becomes apparent that we are far
from being the first discoverers of bodily reality.
That reality was the first knowledge to enter
human understanding: 'They knew that they
were naked' (Genesis 3.7). From then on, it has
been impossible to ignore the body.
Nevertheless, body consciousness, as it is
practiced and spoken of in our society, does
have certain new and original aspects that it is
important to bring out and whose antecedents it
would be useful to set in order in sound genetic
fashion. But so as not to let myself be led astray
(and because I believe that the most fruitful
generalizations are those arising from fairly
precise studies of limited topics), I will confine
myself to a somewhat circumscribed area: the
internal perception of our own bodies -
cenesthesia - which is undeniably a component
of our contemporary 'sensibility', whether
among philosophers or writers, or in certain
psychotherapeutic practices (e.g. Schulz's
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'autogenic training', relaxation, 'body
contacts'), or, finally, in psychoanalytic think-
ing.
We shall not dwell on the theories developed
by the ancients, however fascinating they might
be; but let us recall a few stages of earlier
thinking, before pausing a little longer over the
discussions that prevailed at the end of the
nineteenth century and Freud's response to
them.
In Antiquity, the disciples of Aristippus of
Cyrene spoke of an ' internal contact' - tactus
intimus in Cicero's translation.3 Montaigne,
quoting Cicero, reminds us that 'the
Cyrenaics... maintain that nothing external to
themselves is perceptible, and that the only
things that they do perceive are the sensations
due to internal contact, for example, pain and
pleasure'.4
For a long while, pain and pleasure were not
attributed to a specific sensory system; they
were called 'bodily passions', whereas the
traditional term, internal sense (sensus internus),
referred to the conscious activities that the mind
developed in and of itself (reason, memory and
imagination) on the basis of information pro-
vided by the external senses (sight, hearing,
taste, touch and smell). According to
Aristotelian doctrine, the information provided
by the external senses reached the internal sense
only after having been unified by the common
sense (sensorhim commune, koinon aistheteriori).b
The body was in no way forgotten; but as long
as Galenic medicine prevailed, it was principally
by way of the humors, and not through nervous
information, that the body was capable of
modifying the activity of the soul and, in turn, of
being modified by the soul.
In his treatise The Passions of the Soul,
Descartes put forward a clear distinction be-
tween three different categories of perception:
' that which relates to objects external to us' (art.
23), 'that which refers to our body' (art. 24),
23
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and 'that which refers to our soul' (art. 25).
Bodily sensations were of many kinds:
The cognizings we refer to our body, or to certain of
its parts, are those we have of hunger, thirst and of
our other natural appetites - to which may be added
pain, heat and the other affections which we sense as
in our limbs, not as in external objects.6
Descartes thus analyzes and classes sensory
activities as belonging to three specific areas - the
body, the world and the consciousness - daily
experience of which leads us to an awareness of
how they coincide and are superimposed one
upon the other. But Descartes's influence in this
regard was not particularly great among
eighteenth-century doctors. Some of them, par-
ticularly in Montpellier, were more taken by
Stahl's ideas, which conferred on the viscera a
sort of relative autonomy and independent
sensibility. Nonetheless, some philosophers,
such as Lignac, Turgot or d'Alembert, spoke
with precision of a 'sense of coexistence with our
bodies', of an 'internal touch' and so on.7 Some
of them (for instance, Bordeu, Lacaze and
Diderot) came to pick out a phrenic or dia-
phragmatic center, whose role merged with that
of the splanchnic nexus of the sympathetic
nerve. Cabanis, in 1800, attributed great im-
portance to the ' organic sensations' that ended
in certain centers of reaction, the most important
of which was, obviously, the brain. Thus, the
instincts were the transformation, at the level of
behavior, of the most long-standing and most
persistent of organic sensations. Instinct, thus,
could be seen as the motor branch of a
sensorimotor connection, the sensory branch of
which was made up of 'organic sensations'.
It was in 1794, in Halle, in the title of a
doctoral thesis at which Johann Christian Reil
presided and of which he was the inspiration,
that the word coenesthesis was used for the first
time. The term was equivalent to the German
Gemeingefiihl, for which the French equivalent
subsequently became on some occasions
sensibilite generate (general sensibility) and on
others ce'nesthe'sie (cenesthesia).8
Reil (through the medium of his disciple
Hubner) returned, without mentioning
Descartes, to the tripartite division that we have
already seen in The Passions of the Soul.
We encounter in the soul three sorts of representa-
tions, which differ in relation to the objects
represented.
(1) Its own intellectual state, its powers, its actions,
its representations and concepts; it distinguishes these
things itself, and in this way becomes conscious of
itself.
(2) It represents to itself its external state or the
relations of the whole man to the world.
(3) Finally, it represents to itself its own bodily
state.
Each of these sorts of ideas, by which man is
represented according to the three different types of
state, is sited in the body in its own particular organic
apparatus.
(1) Cenesthesia, by means of which the soul is
informed of the state of its body, which occurs by
means of the nerves generally distributed throughout
the body.
(2) Sensation (sensatio externa). This is excited by
the senses and represents the world to the soul.
(3) Finally, the activities which originate and are
carried out integrally within the organ of the soul.
[Organ der Seek is the term Reil uses to designate the
brain.] By means of these (that is to say, by the
internal sense) imagination and judgement are formed;
the soul receives the representation of its powers, its
ideas and its concepts, and is thus rendered conscious
of itself.9
This distinction between three specific organic
apparatuses can be found again at the beginning
of our century, but without any direct reference
to Reil, in Carl Wernicke. He proposed, as is
well known, a model of psychic life that involved
collaboration between an allopsyche (in relation
to external objects), a somatopsyche (in relation
to corporeal existence) and an autopsyche (in
relation to its own system of representations).10
In Reil (as in Wernicke), this functional distinction
formed the basis for a pathogenic classification.
Reil not only envisaged changes in cenesthesia
due to general disorders, but he allowed there to
be idiopathic disorders of the cenesthesia: there
were in fact cases in which the disease was limited
to the nervous apparatus involved in trans-
mitting the somatic information - in the absence
of any real lesion in the visceral organs or in the
brain itself. A distortion (the anatomo-patho-
logical substratum of which Reil was entirely
incapable of indicating) then sent a misleading
message to the brain about the body's condition.
A bodily illusion occurred - giving rise to a
belief in a tumor or an abdominal parasite,
depite the lack of any objective evidence. Up to
a certain point, judgment could correct this
false impression. But when the impression
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managed to take hold, it created a state of
madness. A good hundred years before the
concept of cenestopathy appeared in France
(with Dupre and Camus), Reil included in his
psychiatric nosology a class of ailments
characterized by a primary disturbance of bodily
representations. This very extensive class
contained the classic examples that had occurred
for the previous two or three centuries in
chapters on melancholia or hypochondria:
people who believed themselves to be made of
glass and liable to shatter at the slightest blow or
who had lost the feeling of being present within
their actual bodies. Reil had no difficulty adding
affective disorders or derangement of the
instincts or the appetites, such as pica, bulimia
and polydipsia on the one hand, and nympho-
mania and lubricity on the other.
'Romantic' thought readily welcomed the
concept of cenesthesia. From a genetic point of
view, Reil had already accorded it priority in the
order of sensory activities: it was the first that
appeared in the fetus. Evolutionist speculation,
right up to physiologists like Purkinje, could
propose the notion of a primary bodily sense
from which all the other sensory activities could
be seen as being differentiated developments. As
the first vital sensation, cenesthesia could be
considered, by some, to be the source of all
psychic life, insofar as that life was made up of
sensory differences. What came to prevail,
among scholars or philosophers claiming to be
determinists or monists, was a 'sensualist'
conception of mental life, which opened the way
for a sort of imperialism of cenesthesia. If
mental life was determined by sensory activity,
and if all sensory activity was made up of
derivatives of cenesthesia, then one could finish
by asserting, as Ribot did in 1884, in The
Diseases of the Personality, that our personality
resided entirely in the messages, partially un-
conscious, that derived from bodily life.
The fifteen French editions of Ribot's The
Diseases of the Personality (published between
1883 and 1914) bear witness to the immense
influence exerted by this book and justify a fairly
close examination of the theories propounded in
it.
A first assertion was based on physiology: 'Its
[consciousness's] production is always associated
with some activity of the nervous system. ' n In
accord with the physiologists, however, Ribot
allowed that a significant part of nervous activity
might remain unconscious:' All nervous activity
does by no means imply psychic activity -
nervous activity being far more extended than
psychic activity. Consciousness, accordingly, is
something superadded.'12 It was, but it was
doomed to intermission. (Ribot underlines the
term, a term to which, as is well known, Proust
was to attach great importance.) The personality
was thus a variable kaleidoscopic phenomenon,
by very reason of the incessant fluctuation of
bodily states.
If, accordingly, we admit that the organic sensations
proceeding from all the tissues, organs and movements
produced - in a word, from all the states of the body
- are in some degree and form represented in the
sensorium; and if the physical personality be only
their sum total, it follows that personality must vary
as they vary, and that these variations admit of all
possible degrees, from simple distemper to the total
metamorphosis of the individual. Instances of'double
personality'...are but an extreme case...We should
find in mental pathology enough observations to
establish a progression, or rather a continuous
regression from the most transient change to the most
complete alteration of the ego...The ego exists only
on the condition of continually changing.13
Following Ribot, Sollier proposed an in-
terpretation of hysteria as the result of changes
in cenesthesia: Seglas attributed to this same
'peripheral' mechanism states of depersonaliz-
ation and melancholic deliria of negation.
One would have no difficulty in demonstrating
that what one is dealing with here is an entirely
theoretical construction, supported in large part
by an entirely metaphorical method of argu-
mentation. The fundamental assumption is of a
causality that operates on the basis of elementary
materials, in which complex phenomena are
built up from simple units. Ribot refers to Taine,
who himself refers to Dr Krishaber to maintain:
'The Ego, the moral person, is a product of
which sensations are the prime factors'.14 To
this neosensualism are added curious political
metaphors, which could have flowed only from
the pen of a convinced democrat. Thus, after
having declared that 'in every animal the basis
of its psychic individuality is the organic sense,'
he adds.
But, in man and with the higher animals, the turbulent
world of desires, passions, perceptions, images and
ideas covers up this silent background. Except at
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given intervals, it is forgotten, from the fact that it is
not known. Here the same takes place as in the order
of social facts. The millions of human beings, making
up a large nation, as regards itself and others, are
reduced to a few thousand men, who constitute its
clear consciousness, and who represent its social
activity in all its aspects, its politics, its industry, its
commerce and its intellectual culture. And yet these
millions of unknown human beings - limited as to
manner and place of existence, quietly living and
quietly passing away-make up all the rest; without
them there would be nothing.15
Ribot, in the closing sentences of the book,
introduces terms like consensus and solidarity,
which have an equally clear social resonance.
The unity of the ego, in a psychological sense, is,
therefore, the cohesion, during a given time, of a
certain number of clear states of consciousness,
accompanied by others less clear, and by a multitude
of physiological states which without being
accompanied by consciousness like the others, yet
operate as much and even more than the former.
Unity, in fact, means coordination. The conclusion to
be drawn from the above remarks is namely this, that
the consensus of consciousness being subordinate to
the consensus of the organism, the problem of the
unity of the ego is, in its ultimate form, a biological
problem. To biology pertains the task of explaining, if
it can, the genesis of organisms and the solidarity of
their component parts. Psychological interpretation
can only follow in its wake.16
What this radical biologism lacked, without
yet having at its disposal the more recent concept
of the genome, was any apparatus of clinical
experiments and proofs. It was hardly surprising,
then, that after a brief moment of glory this
'peripheral' theory of the constitution of the
ego, and above all the interpretation it suggested
of disturbances of the personality, became the
object of lively criticism. Ribot was the first to
admit its shortcomings17 and recognized later
that in attributing so great an importance to
somatic sensory information, he had neglected
the motor components of psychic activity. Pierre
Janet18 observed that in all the cases of
depersonalization he had examined, he had
never been able to demonstrate any kind of
peripheral sensory disturbance and, as a cor-
ollary, that when dealing with tabetics whose
bodily perceptions were seriously upset, he had
not noted any psychic disturbances. To allege a
disturbance in 'corporeal sensoriality' was,
according to him, to remain trapped in a
'metaphysical' hypothesis. Psychopathological
phenomena, such as depersonalization or a sense
of emptiness, should be considered as a lack of
action (or lack of the psychic energy available
for action) and not as a disturbance in sensory
receptivity.' Scientific psychology must consider
psychological facts as actions and express them
in terms of action. A sense of emptiness is a
disturbance of action and not of the sensibility
nor of a poorly understood consciousness'.19
This led Janet to introduce a distinction between
what he called 'primary actions' and 'secondary
actions'. Primary action takes its cue from
sensory stimuli, whether internal or external,
and reacts directly to them; secondary action
brings to primary action the reinforcement of a
belief, an integrating device effective in the
circumstances experienced. Pathological
disturbance, in depersonalization, affects the
secondary action, which can break down without
the primary action showing the slightest
anomaly. It is in the 'relation to the real' that
the real disturbance is to be found.
The affirmation of the primacy of the active
response over somatic information was also
characteristic of Freud's thinking. But before
lingering more closely over a few significant
pages of Freud, it would be appropriate to
devote a moment to the theory put forward by
Charles Blondel in La Conscience Morbide
(1914). (Both a doctor and a philosopher,
Blondel began as a careful follower of the
teachings of Durkheim and Bergson; after the
war, he wrote one of the first important studies of
Proust and composed a hasty and disappointing
work on psychoanalysis.) In La Conscience
Morbide, Blondel opposed to the 'peripheral
theory' an active force - and this active force
was language. It was not that the cenesthetic
message was nonexistent, but it was not its
supposed disruption that explained the
disturbances of the sick mind. According to
Blondel, a purely physiological theory was
incapable of explaining the phenomena observed
by the clinician. The 'cenesthetic masses' (which
he also called 'pure psychology') did not by
themselves determine mental illness: the
' morbid' factor lay entirely in the insufficiency of
the verbal response to the bodily perceptions -
a response worked out by the individual in the
act of thinking according to the linguistic tools
he has received from society. Noting, as Dupre
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had done in his studies on cenestopaths, that the
mentally ill had recourse to a wealth of
metaphorical formulas with which to describe
their symptoms,20 Blondel sited the anomaly not
in the (supposedly neutral) bodily nervous
information but in a fault in the 'eliminatory
action' that should have resulted from a suc-
cessful intervention of language. The normal
mind, according to Blondel, eliminates the idio-
syncratically individual, the 'pure psychology,'
by putting into effect the interpretive tools and
concepts provided by the system of collective
representations. The law of language, which is
the result of social training, has as its function
the depersonalization of the expression that we
give to our individual states. Blondel quoted in
this respect a revealing passage from Durkheim.
There really is a part of ourselves which is not placed
in immediate dependence upon the organic factor:
this is all that which represents society in us. The
general ideas which religion or science fix in our
minds, the mental operations which these ideas
suppose, the beliefs and sentiments which are at the
basis of our moral life, and all these superior forms of
psychic activity which society awakens in us, these do
not follow in the trail of our bodily states, as our
sensations and our general bodily consciousness
do...This is because the world of representations in
which social life passes is superimposed upon its
material substratum, far from arising from it.21
Blondel concluded from this that the normal
mind was a mind in which the cenesthetic factor
was dominated and controlled by the impersonal
system of socialized discourse. While believing
himself to be asserting his ego, the rational
individual was in fact affirming the triumph of
collective norms. The disturbed mind, incapable
of manipulating language according to these
collective dictates, was a mind embroiled in the
individual cenesthetic experience - in the non-
verbal or the preverbal, which even the most
daring play of metaphor was incapable of
expressing. Blondel did not fail to remark the
poetic nature of these attempts, which tended to
imply that poetry was deviant from the social
norms, that it was sited on the side of 'pure
psychology', that it had something in common
with the 'sick mind'.
It was thus not the body that imposed its law
on the mind. It was society that, through the
intermediacy of language, took the commands
of the mind and imposed its law on the body.
Blondel's theory tended to dispose of the body
as cause in order to return to it later as the agent
of the expressive intentions that the individual
imposed on it under the dictates of the collective
consciousness. Thus, we can see interest shifting
from the body as physiological object (primarily
the producer of internal information destined to
be filtered by language) to the body according to
society (primarily carrying out messages bearing
meaning, according to the collective codes and
rules). Social prescriptions dictated not only
language, but also nonverbal bodily manifesta-
tions; there is nothing, in the passage that
follows, that could not be quoted with approval
by any of the sociologists or ' paralinguists' of
today who talk to us of' the body as a medium
of expression \22
In order to find the motor or vasomotor expression of
our states of mind, we are dumbly preoccupied in
seeking the right note, of finding the mime, regulated
and defined by custom and propriety, corresponding
to the emotion standard to which our own emotion
refers. From this point of view mime seems, so to
speak, to have received its morphology and its syntax
from the collective... If one thinks about it hard, it
becomes apparent that there is not a single one of our
motor manifestations which is not thus more or less
stringently defined and with regard to which there
does not exist a collective model, that is to say, a
motor concept, to which it has to conform.23
In writing the Traumdeutung, Freud began by
running up against the generally held late-
nineteenth-century theories which assumed that
dream activity derives from peripheral or visceral
sensory excitation. Ribot, in The Diseases of the
Personality, had formulated in passing a theory
of the dream that was in perfect accord with the
rest of his theory of the primacy of cenesthesia.
Constantly active, they [the physical bases of the
personality] make up by their continuity for their
weakness as psychic elements. Hence, as soon as the
higher forms of mental life disappear, they pass to the
front rank. A clear example of this exists in dreams
(whether pleasant or painful) aroused by organic
sensations, like nightmares, erotic dreams, etc. In
these dreams, even with a certain degree of precision,
we may assign to each organ the part that belongs to
it.24
Freud, well aware of the vast body of literature
that, even before Ribot, tended in the same
direction, devoted several pages of his historic
Introduction to Leibreiztheorie (he used the
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term Gemeingefuhl more rarely) and concluded
that ' the theory of somatic stimulation has not
succeeded in completely doing away with the
apparent absence of determination in the choice
of what dream-images are to be produced \2 5 He
returned to the question again in Chapter 5
('The Material and Sources of Dreams'), section
C ('The Somatic Sources of Dreams').
Freud did not deny that ' organic impressions'
played their part in the production of dreams.
But he did not allow that they could be a sufficient
condition and the only cause: it was not enough
to invoke them to be free of the need to provide
any other explanation. Like Janet, Freud was
opposed to a purely physiological theory, the
more so to one that might be unifactorial or
unicausal, according to which dreams were seen
as being merely the cerebral propagation,
through loose associations, of visceral sensory
stimuli. He noted that these stimuli were not
always efficient; organic sensations, by defini-
tion, are never interrupted, whereas dreams
are intermittent:' These stimuli are present at all
times, and...it is difficult to understand, then,
why the mind does not dream continuously all
through the night'.26 In a number of cases, a
dream may derive solely from psychic sources.
And even when the presence of somatic
sensations can be admitted with a certain degree
of probability, they can be seen as being simply
the material to which work is then applied from
quite another quarter, and that alone gives it
meaning. In relation to its somatic sources, the
dream is a 'reaction', an interpretive working
out, and our scientific attention should be
directed to that reaction; our interpretation
shoud be of the act of interpretation carried out
by the dreamer.
There can be no doubt that physical cenesthesia...is
among the internal somatic stimuli which can dictate
the content of dreams. It can do so not in the sense
that it can provide the dream's content, but in the
sense that it can force upon the dream-thoughts a
choice of the material to be represented...The
cenesthetic feelings left over from the preceding day
link themselves up, no doubt, with the psychical
residues which have such an important influence on
dreams. This general mood may persist unchanged in
the dream or it may be mastered, and thus, if it is
unpleasurable, may be changed into its opposite.
Thus, in my opinion, somatic sources of stimulation
during sleep (that is to say, sensations during sleep),
unless they are of unusual intensity, play a similar
part in the formation of dreams to that played by
recent but indifferent impressions left over from the
previous day. I believe, that is, that they are brought
in to help in the formation of a dream if they fit in
appropriately with the ideational content derived
from the dream's psychical sources, but otherwise
not. They are treated like some cheap material always
ready to hand, which is employed whever it is needed,
in contrast to a precious material which prescribes the
way in which it is to be employed. If, to take a simile,
a patron of the arts brings an artist some rare stone,
such as a piece of onyx, and asks him to create a work
of art from it, then the size of the stone, its color and
markings, help to decide what head or what scene
shall be represented in it. Whereas in the case of a
uniform and plentiful material such as marble or
sandstone, the artist merely follows some idea that is
present in his own mind.2'
All that the somatic sources do, then, is
provide one of the most common materials, of
which the mind of the dreamer, working from
other sources, will make something of its own.
Freud, in his turn, has recourse to metaphors;
the image of the sculptor brings us back to
Aristotelian notions of causality. In Aristotelian
terms, the somatic source is, in the best sense,
the material cause of the dream. But the
neurophysiological is not simply a neutral and
anonymous substratum. The dream has mean-
ing because of the form imposed on this
substratum. This setting into form is the result
of an intention, of which the active agent is
called the 'spirit', the 'wish', 'dream-work'.
Freud assigned a double aim to the dream: to
protect sleep and to fulfil a wish. In both cases,
the dream works according to its own ends,
against the somatic sensation - either to
neutralize it or to transform it. Accepting these
postulates entails an important consequence for
anyone wishing to achieve an adequate under-
standing of dreams. It is vain to trace dreams
back to their physiological source and to invoke
a particular visceral disturbance, which could be
measured in terms of the strength of the painful
stimuli or in variations in the cardiac rate. What
one now has to understand is the new language,
the original form in which this material - in
itself unimportant - has been interpreted and
recast by the dream. Analysis is an exegesis of
the final cause of the dream: it seeks to
understand what the wish is aiming for, and
why.
In other words, dream analysis can be seen as
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the 'informed' interpretation of a 'naive' in-
terpretation, which has itself been reworked at
the moment of narrating the dream. But this
formula is still too simple; for the somatic
stimulus is the starting point for a double
translation. First, it gives rise to the deployment
of latent thoughts, in which the wish can express
itself without reserve; then it transports itself-
through the distortions and puzzles of which
Freud so carefully established the vocabulary -
in the manifest dream. The 'somatic source', the
material cause, was in addition only an oc-
casional cause, a pretext. Freud did not fail to
recognize this, but he felt it unnecessary to
reiterate it. This meant in effect reworking the
definition of the unconscious. Despite what is
fairly widely believed today, it was quite usual to
speak of the unconscious before Freud's time,
but it was an unconscious associated with the
obscure murmurings of visceral functions, from
which would emerge, intermittently, conscious
acts. For Freud, the unconscious was the first
interpretation of visceral stimuli, it was the
latent thoughts of the dream and the process that
gave form to the manifest dream. Freud's
original contribution was not to have spoken
first of the unconscious but to have, so to speak,
lifted the monopoly held on it by organic life
and to have installed it within the psychic
apparatus itself. It was thus at the price of
abandoning the body (in which it was definable
only in terms of weakness or strength, whether
organic or 'nervous') that the unconscious
became the custodian of a language and the
producer of palimpsests or puzzles that were
then open to being deciphered. Having ceased to
have the life of the body as its exclusive source,
the unconscious then escaped from the exclusive
competence of a medical approach and became
dependent on hermeneutics.
Thus, before Durkheim and Blondel opposed
to cenesthesia the conceptual categories of
language set up by the collective consciousness,
Freud, in 1900, opposed to cenesthesia, to
'organic stimuli', the operation of language, but
a language in which the social norms were only
partially represented - by censorship and
interdictions. Another similarity - apart from
any questions of priority - is worth noting:
though the body might see itself being refused
any sort of importance as a causal source of
psychic disturbance, it found a crucial role for
itself as the place or scene in which this
disturbance manifested itself. In a vision that
placed in the background the sensory infor-
mation being provided by the body, and that
emphasized the reaction manifested in the
psychic act and in language, the body came to
appear as the primary target of the act and as
the primary signification worked out in the
language. Just as Durkheim and Blondel, after
having rejected the hypothesis of a cenesthetic
source of psychosis, reestablished the importance
of the body as bearer or enactor of manifesta-
tions of a gestural code of social origin, so Freud
equally returned to the body, no longer con-
sidering it as explanatory source but as the place
in which were carried out the expressive aims of
the wish. Breuer and Freud had already taken
this direction in their studies of hysteria. The
case of the dream was equally clear; and among
the different types of dream, the nightmare
provided a typical example.28
Received medical opinion held that
nightmares were the representational transpo-
sition of a purely somatic oppression. According
to Freud, such a case was the exception; the
greatest number of somatic sufferings felt in
dreams were, on the contrary, the representation
of a censored wish loaded with suffering: what
could not be denied was that the suffering then
expressed itself in the language of the body,
though the 'source' should be sought in the
psyche. The inquiry should turn from the
disturbed body to the affect that was once
revealed and hidden in the somatic register. The
body was the wrong turn, the dead end taken by
energy originating from the psyche, and to
which the term intention was more appropriate
than excitation.
At this point, it seems that in marking a radical
difference between psychological explanation
and physiological explanation, in 'dephysiol-
ogizing' psychology, Freud was 'desomatizing'
the causal system commonly accepted by his
predecessors. There is, in Freud's explanations,
less body and more language than in the majority
of his contemporaries; this explains the dis-
sension that was to grow, at least for a while,
between psychoanalysts and neurophysiologists.
Freud took care never to sever the links with
biology (which is far from being the case with
some of those who subsequently claimed to be
his followers). To be sure, what Freud retained
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of biology did not consist of experimentally
measurable mechanisms but, rather, of general
schemes and of supposedly permanent laws of
the nervous system and living matter. If Freudian
psychology became detached, to some extent,
from the physiological body, metapsychology, in
compensation, showed itself to be a return to
physiology and to the body in an intuitive and
imaginative manner, but guided by phenomena
that had been established sufficiently securely by
experimental physiology to serve as models. One
of the most illuminating texts in this regard is
the 1915 study entitled Instincts and Their
Vicissitudes. The physiological model on which
Freud's thinking was based was that of stimulus
and response, the sensorimotor reflex arc. To
this was added another physiological assump-
tion : 'The nervous system is an apparatus which
has the function of getting rid of the stimuli that
reach it, or of reducing them to the lowest
possible level; or which, if it were feasible, would
maintain itself in an altogether unstimulated
condition.>M
On the basis of these assumptions, Freud
established a distinction (a distinction already
largely foreshadowed in the writings of
nineteenth-century physiologists on instincts and
passions) between external excitation, which is
usually unique and momentary, and internal
excitation, of somatic origin, which acts 'as a
constant force', whose effect is translated as
'need', and whose satisfaction, whose 'mastery',
cannot be carried out according to a single
muscular response, such as flight, which would
constitute the adequate response to the external
excitation. Not only does the instinct derive
from a somatic source, but its satisfaction can be
obtained only by a set of actions directed toward
the exterior. The individual must bring into play
a series of complex behavior patterns, the aim of
which is to modify (to reduce) 'the internal
source of excitation'.
Where the dream was concerned, the ' somatic
source' was optional. Where instincts were
concerned, there was no question of its central
role. But Freud, while conceding it precedence
by right, by the status of a necessary condition
and a material cause, in fact declared it to be
irrelevant to the psychological investigation. At
this level, physiology would have been in
command had it not been (provisionally?
definitively?) disarmed; as for psychology, it
cannot say much.
By the source of an instinct is meant the somatic
process which occurs in an organ or part of the body
and whose stimulus is represented in mental life by an
instinct. We do not know whether this process is
invariably of a chemical nature or whether it may also
correspond to the release of other, e.g. mechanical,
forces. The study of the sources of instincts lies
outside the scope of psychology. Although instincts
are wholly determined by their origin in a somatic
source, in mental life we know them only by their
aims. An exact knowledge of the sources of an instinct
is not invariably necessary for purposes of psycho-
logical investigation; sometimes its source may be
inferred from its aim.30
First remark: The transition from somatic to
psychic, in the case of the instinct, is not the
perceptive order; the instinct is not simply the
cry of the organ echoed and recorded. At least
Freud does not lay any emphasis on this element,
which would immediately raise the question of
its more or less conscious character. The concept
he used was that of representation (reprdsentieren),
which implies an operation of a ' semiotic' nature.
This foreshadows the' second topic', in which the
id can be seen to take on a good part of this
representative function.
Second remark: Contrary to what happened
with the dream, the somatic source is regained at
the end of the instinctual activity, since the aim of
the instinct is a modification in the source of
excitation. But this aim, at first held to be
invariable, can have others substituted for it.
Thus the 'physiological' return to the somatic
source does not take place. That phenomenon,
displacing the site of satisfaction creates to some
extent an illusory body which has nothing to do
with the true (organic) body.
The aim of an instinct is in every instance satisfaction,
which can only be obtained by removing the state of
stimulation at the source of the instinct. But although
the ultimate aim of each instinct remains unchange-
able, there may yet be different paths leading to the
same ultimate aim; so that an instinct may be found
to have various nearer or intermediate aims, which
are combined or interchanged with one another.
Experience permits us also to speak of instincts which
are ' inhibited in their aim', in the case of processes
which are allowed to make some advance toward
instinctual satisfaction but are then inhibited or
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deflected. We may suppose that even processes of this
kind involve a partial satisfaction31.
If 'inhibition in their aim' implies a relative
avoidance of the normal bodily satisfaction, a
sidetracking or diversion in relation to the
necessary 'modification of the source', con-
sideration of the object of the instinct brings up
a number of substitute possibilities, among
which our 'own body' is called upon to play a
major role.
The object of an instinct is the thing in regard to
which or through which the instinct is able to achieve
its aim. It is what is most variable about an instinct
and is not originally connected with it, but becomes
assigned to it only in consequence of being peculiarly
fitted to make satisfaction possible. The object is not
necessarily something extraneous: it may equally well
be a part of the subject's own body. It may be
changed any number of times in the course of the
vicissitudes which the instinct undergoes during its
existence; and highly important parts are played by
this displacement of instinct.32
Our 'own body' thus appears, in the wide-
open repertoire of places (that in which) or of
means (that by means of which) that the instinct
can choose in order to obtain its aim and on
which it can on occasion become fixated. That is
the case when there occurs - as in narcissism or
masochism - a ' turning around of an instinct
upon the subject's own self.
Thus there appears a new role for the body; I
was about to say a new body - the body as
support for fixation or investment. And there is
nothing to stop a new representation, prolonging
or transforming that in which the somatic
excitation has already been prolonged or
transformed. We have not left the body. But if
it is true that there persisted, for Freud, a distant
analogy between the simple reflex arc and the
way in which instincts work, then one could say
that the body-object, the body of investment,
corresponds to a motor performance, which
seeks immediate confirmation in the order of
perceptions, without being able to avoid getting
mixed up in a whole imaginary or symbolic
projection. When Schilder33 came to study the
image of the body, he paid very little attention to
the primary bodily schema, as derives from the
different kinesthetic or somesthetic apparatuses;
he was much more concerned with the image, in
part fantasized, that accompanies the different
types of libidinal investment. What Freud
established, through a system of representations
taking over one from the other, was a circuit
that could renew itself virtually infinitely: from
the body as the source of the instinct to the body
as aim, site or means of 'satisfaction'.
All that I have done here is to recall, in a very
simplified form, the essential characteristics that
make it possible to place Freud's thinking in the
history of ideas about cenesthesia and bodily
sensations. His contribution was considerable:
before him, cenesthesia was the first stage of
a system of sensory information, from which
sprang the personality, fully armed. Whether
conscious or unconscious, these physiological
data exercised their full power straightaway. All
that remained to the higher centers was to
submit to their law, or to respond as best they
could; the traditional model included two terms,
in relation to reciprocity. Traditional medical
thinking used to be able to make only this simple
account, reiterated in innumerable nineteenth-
century works, which started in visceral irritation
and ended in, for instance, mania (or vice versa),
or started in a break in the apparatus of the
somatic sensibilities and ended in depersonaliz-
ation. In Freud, instincts had a goal and gave
rise to much longer and more circumstantial
accounts, as he pursued their migrations, their
substitutions and the meshing of different aims
or objects. It was now a complex circuit that had
to be considered, and no longer a simple short
shuttling between 'action' and 'reaction'. The
feeling of depersonalization, for instance, is a
loss that occurs at the end of a long process;
Mourning and Melancholia traces the various
stages, in which the first false step is the choice
of a narcissistic object. It has no relation to the
primary organic and sensory dysfunction that
Ribot thought to discern.
At the beginning of this essay, I almost
suggested a synonymity between cenesthesia and
awareness of the body. But after our rapid
rereading of Freud, and recalling what he said
about the 'turning around of an instinct upon
the subject's own self in narcissism and maso-
chism, there is a question that cannot be avoided:
Where do we draw the line between cenesthesia,
which must be a basic assumption of every
human existence, and body awareness, which
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would be the hypochondriacal or perverse conse-
quence of a narcissistic or autoerotic investment?
Sartre (who is, through Dumas, so close to
Ribot's ideas) would answer without a moment's
hesitation that the manner in which we 'exist
our contingency' reveals itself to us in
cenesthesia.
When no pain, no specific satisfaction or dissat-
isfaction is 'existed' by consciousness, the for-itself
does not thereby cease to project itself beyond a
contingency which is pure and so to speak unqualified.
Consciousness does not cease ' to have' a body.
Cenesthetic affectivity is, then, a pure, nonpositional
apprehension of a contingency without color, a pure
apprehension of the self as a factual existence. This
perpetual apprehension on the part of my for-itself of
an insipid taste which I cannot place, which
accompanies me even in my efforts to get away from
it, and which is my taste - this is what we have
described elsewhere under the name of Nausea. A dull
and inescapable nausea reveals my body to my
consciousness34.
As for Merleau-Ponty, the discussion of the
notion of the bodily schema leads him to assert
that 'one's own body is the third term, always
tacitly understood, in the figure-background
structure, and every figure stands out against the
double horizon of external and bodily space'.35
But if to this inevitable and naive presence of the
body-a 'nonpositional' (Sartre), 'tacit'
(Merleau-Ponty) presence - is added an
intentional awareness, it is then appropriate to
ask, with Freud, whether this interest
presupposes a regressive or narcissistic libidinal
investment. What I devote to an awareness of
the body, I subtract from my presence in the
world, from my investments in the other. In a
conscious awareness of the body, the aesthetic
element of cenesthesia is in the nature of an
instinctual satisfaction undeniably confused with
primary physiological information. It is a vari-
ation on' turning around upon the subject's own
self. There is nothing very bold in drawing the
only superficially banal conclusion that the
present infatuation with the different modes of
body consciousness is a symptom of the con-
siderable narcissistic component characteristic
of contemporary Western culture. I am, I know,
far from being the first to say so. The so-called
Chicago school, Richard Sennett,36 and a variety
of others have made such a declaration, based
on other premises, a recurrent motif in their
critical thought. Perhaps one could also enter a
plea on behalf of Narcissus (or at least invoke
extenuating circumstances in his favor). In a
world in which technological mastery has made
such rapid strides, can one not understand that
the desire to feel - and to feel oneself- should
arise as a compensation, necessary, even in its
excesses, to our psychic survival?
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